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Abstract  
This paper outlines a plausible mechanism whereby the country of Honduras 
could curtail gang violence within its borders with the eventual intent of exterminating 
gangs in Honduras. First, the need for such a plan is presented, with current 
statistics on the violence in Honduras. The paper then explores the possible use of 
an adapted form of Cold War containment policy against Honduran gangs. This 
method of containment would work by hindering the activities of the gangs and more 
importantly by addressing the societal factors that contribute to gang proliferation. It 
would contain gangs ideologically, economically, and socially, inhibiting their growth 
by stifling their economy and their supply of new members. This paper reviews anti-
gang strategies that have proved ineffective and the reasons for their 
ineffectiveness. After it explicates the nature of the two main gangs in Honduras, it 
discusses containment and its history, and how Cold War containment policy could 
be applied in Honduras. The method, location, and responsibilities of the involved 
parties are described. Concerns relating to the adaptability of containment are also 
addressed. Lastly, this paper briefly discusses the current situation in Honduras’s 
political relationship with the United States.   
Keywords: Gangs, Honduras, Containment Policy, Gang Violence
According to the World Bank’s most recent data, the homicide rate in Honduras, 
a presidential republic in the center of Central America, was 56.52 per 100,000 people 
in 2016 (International Homicides). The National Violence Observatory, reports an even 
higher rate at 59.00 homicides per 100,000 people (Honduras 2018 Crime & Safety 
Report, 13). With regard to homicide, Honduras is the second most dangerous country 
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in the world, outranked only by El Salvador. The majority of this violence is related to 
gang activity. The two most predominant gangs in Honduras are Mara Salvatrucha, 
more often referred to as MS13, and Barrio 18 or 18th Street Gang.  The violence of 
these gangs has ravaged the country since the 1990s. This has contributed to 
decreased tourism and decreased travel within the country, and increased poverty and 
violence (Gangs in Honduras 1, 3). Pervasive government corruption has only aided  
the expansion of gangs (Ratcliffe et al., 112, Wason). In light of these facts, one is 
driven to ask, “What can be done about this?” One possible solution would be for the 
Honduran government and the Honduran people to adopt some of the principles of 
containment policy. Containment was a strategy used by the United States against the 
USSR during the Cold War. George Kennan, a United States diplomat to Russia, is the 
generally accepted father of containment. He not only understood the USSR, but he 
also understood Russian culture, having studied the writings of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and 
Chekhov. He based much of his original ideas of containment on insight he gained from 
this study (“A Conversation with Kennan’s Biographer”). While this strategy was 
originally used by one sovereign nation against another, some components of it can be 
applied by the Honduran Government and people, against gangs in Honduras with the 
eventual intent of extinguishing gangs. 
1. Gangs in Honduras  
Although there are many gangs active in Honduras, the two predominant gangs 
are MS13 and Barrio 18. While both are dependent on extorting the transportation 
system by demanding payments from bus and taxi drivers, Barrio18 heavily extorts its 
local territory as well, demanding payment from pulperia (small, family-owned, corner 
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stores) owners, hardware store owners, and other business owners. This is known as 
micro-extortion (Gangs in Honduras, 20). Besides extortion of the transportation system, 
local drug sales are a major source of income for MS13. Both gangs are organized in a 
loose vertical hierarchy. However, this structure is somewhat more horizontal in Barrio 
18 than in MS13. The highest leader, the “toro,”  is oftentimes incarcerated. He 
manages the gang’s activity and communicates with other gang leaders, sometimes in 
other countries (Gangs in Honduras,16). This may include deciding which colonias 
(neighborhoods) would be advantageous for the gang to control or which drug 
wholesaler to buy from. Under him are the “homies” or “jefes,” which are over the gang 
members and operations in a specific area. Each sub-group is called a “clica.” After the 
jefe comes the soldados and then the paisas firmes. A paisa firme is the last official 
member of the gang. He is in charge of the unofficial members of the gang, the 
banderas. Banderas are, often forcibly recruited, boys usually 6-14 years old. They are 
look-outs, extortion collectors, and errand runners for the gangs (Gangs in Honduras,
17). Family members and girlfriends are sometimes involved with the gang as well. 
They might stash drugs or firearms or make drug runs for the gang (Gangs in Honduras,
18). This hierarchy is typical of Barrio 18, however, MS13 also functions on a similar 
structure. See diagram 1.
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Diagram 1. Gang hierarchy in Barrio 18 and MS13. 
 
MS13 is more tightly structured than Barrio 18.  This is due to the revenue of the 
gang. MS13 draws much of its revenue from drug vending and extortion of the 
transportation system.  This is referred to as macro-extortion. The gang does not extort 
the local neighborhood; this affords it a much better reputation with the local community 
(Gangs in Honduras, 31). Both gangs rely on banderas for information, warnings, and 
small jobs (Gangs in Honduras, 29). There is some evidence that MS13 in Honduras 
may be working in close connection with MS13 in El Salvador. This would indicate that 
MS13 is much more sophisticated than Barrio 18 (Gangs in Honduras, 28).  Another 
difference between MS13 and Barrio 18 is MS13’s more selective use of violence. At 
times MS13 acts as the protector of the people against rival gangs. Members of MS13 
also do not resist the authorities if they are caught (Gangs in Honduras, 35). 
The toros or palabreros (MS13)
Homies Jefes
Soldados Sergeants
Soldiers 
Paisa Firme
LocosPaisa
Mulas Banderas Banderas
Family, Girlfriends, Drug dealers, others affiliated with the gang 
MS13 and Barrio 18
Barrio 18
MS13
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Gangs are fiercely territorial. Their territory is usually divided by colonia or 
neighborhood. New territory is conquered colonia by colonia (Gangs in Honduras, 12). 
When one gang claims a colonia, it will often either displace or kill all persons 
connected with other gangs. On one occasion, after MS13 had recently taken a colonia 
from Barrio 18, they killed an older street vendor who had once been part of Barrio 18. 
The vendor was disabled mentally and physically after having been beaten by and 
thrown out of Barrio 18 in his youth. He posed no threat to MS13, yet they killed him 
anyway (Gangs in Honduras, 36). His murder illustrates the deep territoriality of these 
gangs. InSight Crime’s report states that “the most important operational aspect of the 
Barrio 18 is controlling territory” (Gangs in Honduras, 19).  Territory is vital for many 
reasons. It is a major source of revenue, prestige, and power. It is necessary for storage 
of weapons and drugs, and for the safe lodging of the gang’s members.  
2. Previously Used Anti-Gang Strategies 
Many previous strategies have been employed against the gangs unsuccessfully. 
Among the most notable is Mano Dura, which is also known as Zero Tolerance policy. 
Mano Dura law began in 2003. During this time the police arrested many suspected 
gang members. In an essay on this policy, Lirio Rivera wrote, “Zero tolerance 
demonstrated poor results; not only did it fail to reduce crime and delinquency, but also 
it was unable to control or disband the youth gangs” (Gutíerrez Rivera, 492). 
Incarcerating gang members, it was thought, would reduce the territoriality of the gangs. 
This, however, may have produced quite the opposite effect. Rivera continues to write, 
“Zero-tolerance policies reinforced gang territoriality and the gang community” (492). 
This strategy has clearly been ineffective. Part of this may be due to the underlying 
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cultural value of indirect correction. In Honduran culture, direct confrontation is not 
effective. Since, gangs are a cultural issue, not just a legal problem, disregarding the 
culture in which they proliferate is strategic suicide.
Another strategy that has not yet demonstrated significant success is 
Intelligence-Led Policing.  Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) focuses on gathering 
intelligence and using that data to influence police decision makers, thereby making 
policing more informed and effective (Ratcliffe et al., 114). Due to the high turnover rate 
in the upper police levels, this strategy would be very difficult to implement in Honduras 
successfully. The authors Ratcliffe et al. write, ”The fragmented nature of the HNP and 
the rapid turnover of leadership is a clear impediment to an analyst tasked with 
influencing decision-makers” (114). The analyst plays a vital role in ILP. This would take 
the intelligence out of Intelligence-led Policing, undercutting the whole system.  The 
police, however, are not the only source of corruption. Corruption is rampant in the 
government. Ana Quintana, a senior policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation writes 
that “Corruption continues undermining Honduras’ ability to effectively act in its own 
national interests” (Quintana).  This is a serious drawback to the success of ILP. While 
this system is inadequate on its own, it could potentially be used in conjunction with 
another strategy, specifically one that targeted government corruption. 
The Honduran government and people have experienced many failed anti-gang 
policies, but what would work? Although no idea, strategy, or plan is perfect, an adapted 
policy of containment is a plausible, potent path to gang extinction.    
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3. Containment in the Cold War  
But now, what is containment and how did it work? George F. Kennan is 
generally considered the author of containment. Kennan served as a United States 
diplomat in Russia during and after World War II. He outlined the basic idea of 
containment in 1946 in his “Long Telegram” from Moscow to the government of the 
United States. This eight thousand word cable became the foundation of the United 
States containment policy (The Cold War, 29). He followed this up with the article 
“Sources of Soviet Conduct,” about a year later under the pseudonym Mr. X (Sempa,
179).  Although, the long telegram was foundational to containment it was not its sole 
parent. John latrides wrote in George F. Kennan and the Birth of Containment The 
Greek Test Case that “If the ‘long telegram’ did not actually give birth to the strategy of 
containment, it was nevertheless very important” (129). latrides wrote that “the ‘long 
telegram’ arrived at the perfect moment to encapsulate and bolster the views of key 
officials who had reached similar conclusions on their own” (129). So it would seem that 
some of the ideas of containment were circulating in the minds of some officials in 
Washington, but it was Kennan who first, best, and most completely articulated the idea 
of containment. 
 Essentially, this strategy aimed at restricting the expansion of communism 
ideologically and physically. During the first stages, the United States economically 
boosted countries that were in danger of falling to communism either through the inward 
rise of a Communist party or through the outward threat of invasion by the USSR (The 
Cold War, 31). The United States also posted troops in the vicinity of these countries to 
discourage the USSR from invading them. This was known as the Marshall Plan (“A 
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Conversation with Kennan’s Biographer”). The latter stages were very different as many 
presidents edited containment to fit their desires. Throughout the duration of the Cold 
War, each President modified containment to his liking. The Eisenhower administration 
sought a more offensive approach, with the aim of “rolling back” the Soviet Union. This, 
however, proved too risky and so the administration resigned itself to containment in 
some regions (Sempa, 182). The Nixon administration followed Kennan’s original idea 
of containment more closely than perhaps any other administration (Sempa, 182).  At 
times, when the President relied strongly on his advisers, containment policy was a 
mishmash of multiple conflicting ideas. This occurred during the presidency of Jimmy 
Carter, leading many to comment that Carter had simply “stapled the drafts” of his 
disagreeing advisors together (Strategies of Containment, 347).  When Reagan became 
President, containment took a more constricting turn. In Strategies of Containment, 
Gaddis wrote that Reagan sought the best way to use containment to achieve Kennan’s 
original intent, “To increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must 
operate” (353). This version of containment was possibly the most effective. Reagan 
exploited the weaknesses of the Soviet Union economically and ideologically. 
4. Containment in Honduras  
Unsurprisingly, containment policy cannot be simply picked up and plopped down 
onto the gang situation in Honduras. The factors, players, and consequences of each 
situation are vastly different. Containment was a strategy to be employed by one 
superpower state against another superpower state. It was tailored to slowly kill a state 
whose goals threatened the security of the Western world.  The situation in Honduras is 
not state-against-state. Gangs are not a sovereign state; rather they are a violent anti-
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state organization.  The differences in the situation are readily apparent. So, how could 
containment be in any way applicable? To see this, it is helpful to remember that 
containment was a strategy fashioned to 1. avoid all-out war with the USSR because 
the United States could not afford that, and 2. to end the communist threat to the 
Western world. The goals of a strategy against gangs in Honduras would be 1. to avoid 
all-out war, which it is doubtful the government would or could accomplish, and 2. to 
extinguish the gangs in Honduras. As the style of a tailored suit may be becoming on 
several deferent people, perhaps in a different sizes or colors, so an altered 
containment strategy could be soluble to the Honduran gang situation. The goals, that 
Cold War containment was designed to achieve, are, in principle, the same goals that 
an altered containment strategy would seek to fulfill in Honduras. The major gangs are 
organized and coherent enough that some principles of containment are applicable.  In 
his book Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War, Gaddis affirms that containment is a transferable approach. 
He writes “Great grand strategies are bounded by time and space, but they also 
transcend time and space. […] the adjective ‘great’ implies relevance beyond context. It 
suggests that the strategy in question can serve as a guide in periods, places, and 
circumstances yet to come” (380). The most transferable aspects of containment to the 
Honduran setting would be economic boosting in at-risk areas, more comprehensive 
police training, legislature changes, and cultural awareness. George Kennan 
understood the importance of cultural awareness when inventing a strategy. Before he 
devised containment, he sought to understand Russian culture (“A Conversation with 
Kennan’s Biographer”). Kennan accomplished this by studying Russian literature. He 
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learned that patience was a key virtue in Russian culture and incorporated this into 
containment (“A Conversation with Kennan’s Biographer”). 
The Government’s role in Containment 
To apply these principles of containment in Honduras, one must have a method 
and a location in which to start. In a designated location, the government and the people 
must begin to reverse the circumstances that promote and enable gangs to thrive in 
Honduras. Due to limited resources, capabilities, and the risk of all-out war with the 
gangs, most of this strategy would start small in one colonia in one city. The first 
colonias in which containment would be enacted should most likely be areas that are at-
risk to falling under gang control. Within these areas, the government would work to 
build up the confidence of the people in itself. Then, it would increase policing in the 
area. In areas that are very poor, the government would encourage business and 
entrepreneurship mainly by providing security. This security would aim at making 
extortion nearly impossible, thus, cutting revenue to gangs, while increasing the 
prosperity of the local economy. This plan is not an immediate fix. Rather, it is an 
agenda that hopes to slowly constrict the gangs until they collapse. This plan has no 
fixed time table but will expand based on resources and capabilities. These local 
government initiatives would contain gang activity and economy.   
While much of containment would occur on a local level, this strategy would also 
include several national tactics. These national objectives would subtly attack some of 
the societal factors that promote gang proliferation. First, the government would 
consistently work toward eliminating corruption, thus promoting trust. Second, and hand 
in hand with the first objective, would be training the police force ethically and tactically 
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as both areas are pitiably lacking. Authors Jerry Ratcliffe, Evan Sorg, and James Rose 
describe the Honduran police force as “fragmented, antiquated and disorganized.” They 
add that “Police corruption in the country has been described as ‘endemic’” (Jerry H. 
Ratcliffe, Evan T. Sorg, James W. Rose, 112). Third, the tax on marriage would be 
abolished and instead the tax on alcohol and tobacco would be raised.  A small tax cut 
could be offered for married couples in the first year of marriage. Instead of penalizing 
marriage it would be incentivized. This would promote more healthy families and thus 
reduce the number of virtually fatherless children, making them less susceptible to gang 
recruitment and impressment. This set of objectives would contain gangs ideologically, 
and socially. 
The Citizens’ Role in Containment 
The citizen’s responsibility in containment would focus on preventing children 
from being used by or entering the gangs. This would be the work of families and 
churches. They would work to identify children at risk for being drawn into gangs and 
provide for their needs whether those are emotional or physical. This could mean 
churches coming together to provide homes and necessities for high—risk children. By 
protecting children from being used as banderas, the Honduran people would effectively 
short-out the warning system of the gangs, as well as much of their errand running and 
extortion collecting system. In order to fill the positions left vacant, the gangs would 
have to use more of their higher ranking members to do routine errands. This would 
contain the growth and efficiency of gangs. The amended version of containment that 
could be utilized in Honduras would be a slowly constricting method that would indirectly 
attack the weak points of gangs.                                                                                                                                     
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Location 
 One location that would be a prime place to initiate a containment strategy would 
be the city of Comayagua (circled in red below). It is centrally located, has strong 
tourism potential, and is not overrun by gangs. In the center of the Spanish colonial city 
stands one of the oldest cathedrals in Central America, with one of the oldest clocks and 
one of the oldest pipe organs in Central America. It is also home to a Honduran military 
base, Soto Cano Air Base, which hosts United States military. Although this city is 
relatively safe, gang violence is still present. These factors make it an excellent location 
to begin containment.
Map 1. Map of Honduras (“Map of Honduras”)
Limitations 
As with any plan, this one has its limitations.  One may ask, “How can one be 
sure this will work?” The answer is, one cannot know for certain that this constricting 
containment will work. One can never know if a strategy will work until it has been 
attempted. However, one can have reasonable, historical assurance of the feasibility of 
an idea. And this is present concerning containment. It was effective in the Cold War, 
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and has been lauded as a “great grand strategy.”  It has lived up to this title. Gaddis 
wrote, “By the end of the Cold war, the successes of containment had clearly 
outweighed its failures. There was no war with the Soviet Union, […] and no 
appeasement either” (Strategies of Containment, 381). Gaddis then righty applauds 
containment saying, “It is difficult to imagine any peacetime grand strategy in which the 
results produced in the end corresponded more closely with the objectives specified at 
the beginning” (381). But, one may ask, will it apply to the situation in Honduras? 
Gaddis discusses the transferability of containment in Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, writing, 
“Leaders will be applying its lessons in periods, places, and circumstances that nobody 
can now foresee” (381). Clearly, Kennan believed that containment was a transferable 
concept.  This strategy is especially transferable because it considers the cultural 
particularities of the area in which it is implemented. In Honduras, indirect correction is a 
cultural value, subconsciously used in everyday interactions, whether at home, work, 
school, or church. Fittingly, containment indirectly constricts gangs. Thus, Honduran 
people will be more understanding and more supportive of this less culturally offensive 
strategy, than they have been with previous strategies.  
5. Conclusion 
Some components of containment policy can be applied by the Honduran 
Government and people against gangs in Honduras with the eventual intent of 
extinguishing gangs. This strategy of containment would constrict Honduran gangs’ 
ideology, economy, expansion, movement, and efficiency. Not only is a solution to the 
issue of gangs vital to the development of Honduras but, it also benefits the United 
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States. By extinguishing gang violence in Honduras, many people will not have the 
desperate need to immigrate illegally. Illegal immigration-related issues are frequent 
headlines in United States news, reflecting that this is a major American societal issue.  
Implementing an adapted containment policy will benefit all of the countries involved. 
Honduras will not lose its people to violence and emigration. And so, it will continue to 
develop culturally and economically.  Implementing containment now could be 
especially profitable for Honduras. With headlines bannering the Northern Triangle’s 
loss of United States foreign aid and the potential future closure of the United States-
Mexico border, the political pressure on Honduras to take more positive action to treat 
its grievous socio-economic maladies is rapidly increasing. Adopting a containment 
strategy now could be exactly the right step for the Honduran government to take, in 
order to show its people and the United States that it will initiate effective measures to 
end gang violence and promote economic growth. While there has been much backlash 
over Trump’s decision to end aid to the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador), W.J. Hennigan writes for Time “President Donald Trump stumbled into a hard 
truth of international migration this week: No amount of foreign aid is going to stop the 
exodus of undocumented migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to the 
United States as long as those Central American countries remain impoverished, 
dangerous and unstable” (Hennigan). Until the Honduran government takes a more 
definitive initiative in actively solving its national issues, it is unlikely it will receive any 
significant foreign aid.  An altered containment strategy could be a much more 
efficacious method to end gang violence than any strategy yet employed in Honduras.  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